2 Churchill, The Second World War, Bd. VI, S. 442, erklärt: „There was no agreement to debar him [Eisenhower] from occupying Prague if it were militarily feasible” (vgl. dagegen die Äußerungen Beneš' zu dieser Frage; s. o. S. 34, Anm. 1). In diesem Sinne telegrafierte er am 7. Mai an Eisenhower: „I am hoping that your plan does not inhibit you to advance to Prague if you have the troops and do not meet the Russians earlier. I thought you did not mean to tie yourself down if you had the troops and the country was empty. Don't bother to reply by wire, but tell me when we next have a talk.” Von der politischen Bedeutung der Besetzung Prags durch alliierte Truppen überzeugt, hatte er bereits am 30. April an Truman telegrafiert: „There can be little doubt that the liberation of Prague and as much as possible of the territory of Western Czechoslovakia by your forces might make the whole difference to the postwar Situation in Czechoslovakia, and might well influence that in nearby countries. On the other hand, if the Western Allies play no significant part in Czechoslovakian liberation that country will go the way of Yugoslavia.
Of course, such a move by Eisenhower must not interfere with his main operations against the Germans, but I think the highly important political consideration mentioned above should be brought to his attention.”